Does an extradition judge have greater powers than a preliminary hearing judge?

In Republic of Argentina v. Mellino, 1987 CanLII 49 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536 La Forest J. said, at 553, in response to the statement that the extradition judge enjoyed powers wider than that of a preliminary hearing judge: I cannot accept this proposition. It seems to me, to ignore the modest function of an extradition hearing which (barring minimal statutory and treaty exceptions) is merely to determine whether the relevant crime falls within the appropriate treaty and whether the evidence presented is sufficient to justify the executive surrendering the fugitive to the requesting country for trial there. Responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations, including the performance of Canada’s obligations under extradition treaties, is, of course, vested in the executive. I repeat: the role of the extradition judge is a modest one; absent express statutory or treaty authorization, the sole purpose of an extradition hearing is to ensure that the evidence establishes a prima facie case that the extradition crime has been committed. The procedure bears a considerable affinity to a preliminary hearing, and the judge’s powers have some similarity to those of a magistrate presiding at such a hearing…