What is the test for determining whether a person stands in the place of a parent within the meaning of the Divorce Act?

The legal framework which applies to the issue of whether the petitioner is a “parent” within the meaning of subparagraph (c) of the definition in s. 2 of the Act, is well established. The leading case is Chartier v. Chartier, 1999 CanLII 707 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242, [1999] 4 W.W.R. 633. Bastarache J. there outlines the key principles as follows: 38 What then is the proper test for determining whether a person stands in the place of a parent within the meaning of the Divorce Act? The appellant argued that the test for whether or not a person stands in the place of a parent should be determined exclusively from the perspective of the child. I cannot accept this test. In many cases, a child will be very young and it will be difficult to determine whether that child considers the person as a parental figure. Further, an older child may resent his or her step‑parent and reject the authority of that person as a parent, even though, objectively, that person effectively provides for the child and stands in the place of a parent. The opinion of the child regarding the relationship with the step‑parent is important, but it constitutes only one of many factors to be considered. In particular, attention must be given to the representations of the step‑parent, independently of the child's response. 39 Whether a person stands in the place of a parent must take into account all factors relevant to that determination, viewed objectively. What must be determined is the nature of the relationship. The Divorce Act makes no mention of formal expressions of intent. The focus on voluntariness and intention in Carignan was dependent on the common law approach discussed earlier. It was wrong. The court must determine the nature of the relationship by looking at a number of factors, among which is intention. Intention will not only be expressed formally. The court must also infer intention from actions, and take into consideration that even expressed intentions may sometimes change. The actual fact of forming a new family is a key factor in drawing an inference that the step‑parent treats the child as a member of his or her family, i.e., a child of the marriage. The relevant factors in defining the parental relationship include, but are not limited to, whether the child participates in the extended family in the same way as would a biological child; whether the person provides financially for the child (depending on ability to pay); whether the person disciplines the child as a parent; whether the person represents to the child, the family, the world, either explicitly or implicitly, that he or she is responsible as a parent to the child; the nature or existence of the child's relationship with the absent biological parent. The manifestation of the intention of the step‑parent cannot be qualified as to duration, or be otherwise made conditional or qualified, even if this intention is manifested expressly. Once it is shown that the child is to be considered, in fact, a "child of the marriage", the obligations of the step‑parent towards him or her are the same as those relative to a child born of the marriage with regard to the application of the Divorce Act. The step‑parent, at this point, does not only incur obligations. He or she also acquires certain rights, such as the right to apply eventually for custody or access under s. 16(1) of the Divorce Act. 40 Nevertheless, not every adult‑child relationship will be determined to be one where the adult stands in the place of a parent. Every case must be determined on its own facts and it must be established from the evidence that the adult acted so as to stand in the place of a parent to the child.