What is the impact of the term “spousal services” in the context of spousal compensation?

In paragraph 16, she went on to say: In any event, the fact that “spousal services” can be and are now regarded by Canadian courts as valuable and compensable does not in my view remove the necessity of determining on the facts of each case whether there is no juristic reason for the enrichment – i.e., whether the enrichment is “unjust” or, in the terms advanced by Cory J. [in Peter v. Beblow], whether one party’s expectation to share in the other’s property is a “legitimate” one.

As Errico J. put it in Strachan v. Brownbridge [1997] B.C.J. No. 1131 (B.C.S.C.): It appears then that in analyzing whether there has been an unjust enrichment, the contributions of the recipient of the benefit cannot be taken into account in determining whether there has been an unjust enrichment. It is only when the quantification of that unjust enrichment is to be assessed that the counter contribution can be taken into account. Provision of domestic services and child care is a benefit. There is an inference that if there is a benefit there has been a deprivation. There is a further inference that in spousal relationships where there has been an enrichment and a deprivation, then there is an inference that there is no juristic reason for the benefit and deprivation and thus there has been an unjust enrichment. If the trier of fact is to consider whether or not there has been a counter contribution and take that into account in quantifying the unjust enrichment, and that counter contribution equals or exceeds the contribution, is there then still an unjust enrichment? That can hardly be so, but that analysis has not been dealt with in any of the authorities as far as I’m aware.