What constitutes a material change of circumstance in a family law case?

This is an unusual situation, in the sense the “change in circumstance” arises out of the fact that the events did not unfold in the manner that the court anticipated or hoped they would. One could argue that such an eventuality would always have been within the contemplation of the court, such that it could not be said to qualify as a material change of circumstance not taken into account when the order was made. However, in my view this would be an unduly narrow and artificial way of looking at the circumstances. Courts must apply a “flexible standard of judicial discretion” which takes into account the “diversity of possible scenarios” that can arise in family law cases. See Dedes v. Dedes, 2015 BCCA 194 at para.18, citing Willick v. Willick, 1994 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670 at p.688. This is not a case where there were a range of possible outcomes all of which were contemplated or accounted for when the previous order was made. Rather, it is a case in which, owing to a confluence of circumstances that that took place after the previous hearing, the very premises on which the previous order were made have fallen away. I would highlight two particular features of the case in this regard.