In Irving, Seaton J.A. cites Salmon L.J.’s reasons in Allen v. McAlpine as follows: ... In order for such an application [to have an action dismissed for want of prosecution] to succeed, the defendant must show: (1) that there has been inordinate delay. ... What is or is not inordinate delay must depend upon the facts of each particular case. These vary infinitely from case to case, but inordinate delay should not be too difficult to recognize when it occurs. (2) that this inordinate delay is inexcusable. As a rule, until a credible excuse is made out, the natural inference would be that it is inexcusable. (3) that the defendants are likely to be seriously prejudiced by the delay. ... In addition to any inference that may properly be drawn from the delay itself, prejudice can sometimes be directly proved. As a rule, the longer the delay, the greater the likelihood of serious prejudice at the trial. If the defendant establishes the three factors to which I have referred, the court, in exercising its discretion, must take into consideration the position of the plaintiff himself and strike a balance. If he is personally to blame for the delay, no difficulty arises. There can be no injustice in his bearing the consequences of his own fault.
"The most advanced legal research software ever built."
The above passage should not be considered legal advice. Reliable answers to complex legal questions require comprehensive research memos. To learn more visit www.alexi.com.