[45] The Court of Appeal, in Petch, described the basis for its conclusion in the following fashion (at page 738): ...Where statute requires an act to be done in a particular manner, it may be possible to regard the requirement that the act be done in a particular manner as merely directory. In such a case the statutory requirement can be treated as substantially complied with if the act is done in a manner which is not less satisfactory having regard to the purpose of the legislature in imposing the requirement. But that is not the case with a stipulation as to time. If the only time limit which is prescribed is not obligatory, there is no time limit at all. Doing an act late is not the equivalent of doing it in time. That is why Grove J. said in Barker v. Palmer (1881) 8 QBD 9, at 10-‘provisions with respect to time are always obligatory, unless a power of extending the time is given to the court.’ This probably cannot be laid down as a universal rule, but in my judgement it must be the normal one. Unless the court is given a power to extend the time, or some other and final mandatory time limit can be spelled out of the statute, a time limit cannot be relaxed without being dispensed with altogether; and it cannot be dispensed with altogether unless the substantive requirement itself can be dispensed with. 28.
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