Can a jury award pain and suffering damages?

In Campbell v. Gray, [1994] B.C.J. No.1369, the jury awarded damages for loss of income and for special damages however it awarded nothing for pain and suffering. Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the verdict should not be entered. Leggatt J. stated at paragraph 5: The question for the court is whether such a verdict is perverse in that there is either [sic] no evidence to support the finding for such a verdict and, therefore, the verdict cannot provide a foundation for judgment. I cannot conclude that a jury, reviewing the evidence as a whole, and acting judicially could not have reached this conclusion. Clearly, the verdict was based on a two-third majority and it is a reasonable inference to believe that each question may very well have been voted on separately. It is entirely within the realm of the evidence that even though there may not have been additional pain and discomfort suffered as a result of the minor rear end collision, additional costs and expenses were honestly incurred by the plaintiff even though she did not suffer additional pain as a result of the collision. In my view, the court should be loathe to interfere with jury verdicts where there is any evidence to sustain those verdicts.