What is the test for a motion to seek a court order for questioning in a family law case?

The threshold to meet for the court to make an order to permit questioning is very low. Bringing a motion to seek an order for questioning is often a matter of prudence for counsel in a case given the fractious nature of family law in today’s world. Justice J.W. Quinn in Gordon v. Starr, 2007 CanLII 19137 (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 2062 describes not only the prudence of questioning, but also the cost benefit analysis for an order permitting questioning in these terms: 21 Compliance with clause 20(8)(b) is objectively determinable. Subrule 20(5) is more vague and it sets out a very low threshold for obtaining an order permitting questioning. In most instances, I think that it is folly for parties (at least those represented by counsel) "to carry on with the case without" questioning. When one considers the fluff and pap that comprise so much of the affidavit material in family litigation, an hour, perhaps two, of well-prepared questioning will likely be all that is needed to precisely inform astute counsel of the case that he or she has to meet and to end the posturing. As well, bearing in mind the delay and cost involved in the "to-ing" and "fro-ing" of navigating family court at the best of times, it is difficult to imagine how questioning could amount to "unacceptable delay" or an "undue expense," as stipulated in paragraph 3 of subrule 20(5).7 To so conclude underestimates the amount of time involved and how quickly costs can mount, when: lawyer A writes to lawyer B and requests certain information; lawyer B contacts or meets with his client or otherwise obtains instructions and responds to lawyer A; lawyer A then contacts or meets with his or her client or otherwise obtains instructions; no doubt to be followed by a merry-go-round of further correspondence and communications. I respectfully disagree with those who suggest that court-ordered questioning should be viewed as a last-resort method of obtaining information.