Can a defence counsel argue that disclosure of material risks must be disclosed?

Defence counsel argues that those risks which can be characterized as material, special or unusual have to be disclosed. A risk which is a mere possibility may be considered material if its occurrence carries serious consequences. He quotes from Hopp v. Lepp (1980), 1980 CanLII 14 (SCC), 112 D.L.R. (3d) 67 at 80-81 (S.C.C.): Probable risks, which must be disclosed, have been contrasted with mere possibilities (as, for example, risks involved in any operation), but this dichotomy cannot be absolute because it ought to take note of whether a risk is or is not quite remote, and here the gravity of the consequences, if a risk should materialize, must be brought into account; for example, the risk of death, even if a mere possibility, as contrasted with some residual stiffness of a member of the body. A second classification, expressed in American cases and American writings, is that of material and immaterial risks. Under this classification possible risks whose consequences would be grave could well be regarded as material. Materiality connotes an objective test, according to what would reasonably be regarded as influencing a patient's consent.