When the two standards of reasonableness and patent unreasonableness have been collapsed into a single standard, what is the current state of the law on deference?

The appellant argues that Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan predates the decision in Dunsmuir and therefore has not considered the approach to deference when the standards of reasonableness and patent unreasonableness have been collapsed into a single standard. Although the majority in Dunsmuir did not offer specific comment on whether there are varying degrees of deference within the reasonableness standard, the appellant relies on the views expressed by Binnie J. in his concurring opinion. At para. 139, Binnie J. notes that the decision to collapse reasonableness simpliciter and patent unreasonableness served to “shift the debate (slightly) from choosing between two standards of reasonableness that each represent a different level of deference to a debate within a single standard of reasonableness to determine the appropriate level of deference.” [Emphasis in original.]