Is exclusion of common law couples from the property division and support regimes applicable to married and civil union spouses violated section 15(1) of the Charter?

To summarize, a five-to-four majority held that the exclusion of de facto spouses from the property division and support regimes applicable to married and civil union spouses violated s. 15(1). However, with respect to the property division measures, four of those judges held that the violation was justified under s. 1, and joined the four who concluded that there was no violation of s. 15(1) in upholding the exclusion. In effect, the court in Québec v. A upheld Walsh: the exclusion of common law couples from a statutory regime of equal sharing upon relationship breakdown is not a violation of the Charter. Applying Québec v. A to the instant case

The parties agree that, on the basis of Québec v. A, the exclusion of common law spouses from the definition of “spouse” under the Intestate Succession Act violates s. 15(1) of the Charter. The Act denies unmarried spouses the right to inherit from a spouse who dies intestate – a right that is available to married spouses. The law therefore creates a distinction based on the analogous ground of marital status. That distinction perpetuates the effects of an historical disadvantage rooted in prejudice. It is also based on the false stereotype that common law spouses have chosen not to assume the rights and obligations of an intestate succession regime that applies to married spouses by default. Having found a violation of s. 15(1), it is necessary to determine whether that violation is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.