Can a conscientious objector claim refugee protection in the United States?

I recognize that there is a compelling policy rationale for affording refugee protection to persons faced with the choice of either being punished for refusing to serve or being placed at risk of participating (or being complicit) in the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity: see Tagaga v. I.N.S., 228 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2000), at pages 1034-1035. Where the requirements of military service would put a person at risk of being excluded from refugee protection, the law must provide a meaningful anticipatory option. The idea that a refugee claimant in such circumstances ought to be returned to his home country to face such a dilemma is repugnant and inimical to the furtherance of humanitarian law. It does not follow from this, however, that widespread violations of international law carried out by a military force but not rising to the level of war crimes or crimes against humanity can never support a refugee claim by a conscientious objector. The case law I have reviewed does not support the idea that refugee protection is only available where the particulars of one’s objection to military service would, if carried out, exclude a claim by that person to protection.