Is there any case law where an investigator made a mistake in calculating the statutory time for filing a claim for damages against a public entity?

The investigator's error was less culpable than the attorney in Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 976, 58 Cal.Rptr. 20. In that case, a claim was not filed within the statutory time because of a [84 Cal.App.3d 537] calendaring error in the attorney's office. The record was devoid of any evidence of how the error occurred or of an established office procedure for avoiding such mistakes. Nevertheless, the trial court's denial of the petition for leave to file a late claim was reversed as an abuse of discretion.

A similar error was committed by the attorney in Segal v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 509, 90 Cal.Rptr. 720. He failed to perform a routine arithmetical calculation properly and filed on the 101st day believing that he had filed on the 100th day. The trial court's denial of the petition was reversed.

An even more egregious error was committed by the attorneys in Flores v. Board of Supervisors (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 480, 91 Cal.Rptr. 717, wherein the appellate court stated: "The legally salient fact for the purpose of this appeal is the candid admission of appellants' attorneys that the lateness of the claim was due to their failure to open a file which in turn would have reminded them of the 100-day limitation upon the presentation of appellants' claim." (Id., at p. 483, 91 Cal.Rptr. at p. 718.) Yet an order denying a petition for relief was reversed.

In Viles v. State of California, supra, 66 Cal.2d 24, 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818, the plaintiff, relying on the advice of representatives of private parties, thought he had one year to file an action. He waited nine months before seeking the advice of an attorney.

In the case at bench, the plaintiff sought legal representation well within the 100-day period. The attorneys did more than open a file; extensive investigation was conducted. Courts "are somewhat loath to penalize a litigant on account of some omission on the part of his attorney, particularly where the litigant himself has acted promptly and has relied, as in the instant case, upon the attorney to protect his rights." (Stub v. Harrison (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 685, 689-690, 96 P.2d 979, 981.)

An order denying relief runs counter to the law's policy encouraging trial and

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[84 Cal.App.3d 538] In weighing a motion for relief, the absence of prejudice to the public entity should be considered. (Segal v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 12 Cal.App.3d 509, 90 Cal.Rptr. 720; Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 976, 58 Cal.Rptr. 20.) There is a complete lack of evidence of prejudice in this case. There is no showing that the pipe or canal or surrounding property had in any way been altered between the date of the accident and notification to West Kern.