Is there any case law in which a defendant has argued that defense counsel should have sought to exclude or restrict the impeachment evidence discussed in Section II of the California Evidence Code?

Next, defendant contends that defense counsel should have placed a "formal objection on the record" regarding the impeachment evidence (arson arrest, interview, and conviction) discussed in Section II. This argument fails as defense counsel vigorously advocated for limiting the impeachment evidence and argued that any impeachment should be limited to whether defendant had been investigated before "without mentioning what it is for because that isn't relevant to [defendant's] response." (See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 188, disapproved on another ground in People v. Stansbury, 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1 ["Evidence Code section 353 [erroneous admission of evidence] does not exalt form over substance. No particular form of objection or motion is required; it is sufficient that the presentation contain a request to exclude specific evidence on the specific legal ground urged on appeal"].) Similarly, defendant's contention that counsel should have requested an instruction that the jury limit its "consideration of the arson evidence to impeachment only, and not use the evidence as substantive evidence of guilt or propensity evidence" is without merit. The jury was instructed that if it found "a witness has been convicted of a felony, [it] may

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