Is the reasonable doubt instruction insufficient to support the definition of reasonable doubt in CALCRIM No. 220?

Defendant maintains the reasonable doubt instruction is insufficient because the misconduct "does not run counter to the definition of reasonable doubt in CALCRIM No. 220[ but rather] 'helps explain' the concept of 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' and how to arrive at an 'abiding conviction' in a way that is easier for jurors to understand than the vague jury instruction." According to defendant, that "means many jurors are likely to rely on it as a plain-language interpretation that stands in for the more obscure language of the actual instruction." The contention is unsupported and goes against the fundamental assumption "that jurors are presumed to be intelligent and capable of understanding and applying the court's instructions." (People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 940.) We thus reject it.