Is remedial in the context of workers’ compensation legislation?

In Ishida v. Itterman, supra, Fulton J. stated at p. 146 in considering whether the amendment to the British Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act was remedial: “Indeed, in the particular situation involved here, I am inclined to the view that the discussion is somewhat sterile, for I fail to see how legislation which creates an immunity from suit, as this does, and which can thus be said to confer a benefit or be remedial when looked at from one point of view, can do so without depriving persons, who would otherwise enjoy a legitimate right of action, of that right — namely, the right to sue for the consequences of tortious conduct. This legislation clearly does both — at least for the future. For every immunity granted or benefit conferred there must, by the very nature and effect of the legislation, be a corresponding loss or deprivation of right. “Nor can the matter be determined by consideration of whether, as argued by counsel for the defendants, the legislation is remedial in the general sense of being designed for the benefit of the public or to cure a general evil. It must be presumed that all legislation is intended to be for the public good: but to hold that for this reason it should be given retrospective effect as extinguishing the right to maintain an action already commenced when it was passed would, surely, be to strike down the principle which the law has carefully and clearly asserted over the years in applying statutes which take away rights.”