Is evidence of a defendant's mental defect and/or voluntary intoxication admissible?

The determination of whether evidence of the defendant's mental defect and/or voluntary intoxication is relevant and admissible depends on whether the charged offense is a general or specific intent crime. (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1127 (Mendoza).)

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The terms "[s]pecific and general intent have been notoriously difficult terms to define and apply ...." (People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456 (Hood).)

"When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent." (Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 456-457; Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1123; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 518, fn. 15.)

"When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent." (Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 457; People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 518, fn. 15.)

However, these definitions " 'should not be applied mechanically....' [Citation.]" (Reyes, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 983.) "A general intent crime may also involve a specific mental state, such as knowledge. [Citations.]" (People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 380.)