Is adverse possession of a public interest prohibited under the California Public Prosecutions Act?

We think plaintiffs' argument depends on an excessively wooden construction of the statute. As we read the basis for the statute, the reason for prohibiting adverse possession of public property is because there may be little incentive for a public entity to be aware of who is using public property or take steps to interfere with a potential adverse possessor. (See generally People v. Banning Co. (1914) 167 Cal. 643, 648, 140 P. 587 [use of state lands by private persons is deemed a permissive use acquiesced in by the state].) If that is the case, there is even less incentive where the property or interest is owned by the "public" in general rather than some governmental entity. For the purposes of this statute, we believe "public entity" includes the "public" at large.

[217 Cal.App.3d 287] Plaintiffs assert that even if adverse possession is unavailable, their pleadings in the trial court alleged theories of abandonment and estoppel which the trial court found it unnecessary to rule on and which they are entitled to present and have determined. While the merit of such a claim on this record seems questionable (see City of Sacramento v. Jensen (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 114, 122-123, 303 P.2d 549), we cannot presume what facts plaintiffs might be able to present to substantiate their claim. Accordingly, the matter must be remanded for a determination of this issue as well as any additional questions the court reserved for later resolution. ⁷