Is a prison officer entitled to qualified immunity from prosecution for interfering with an inmate's religious beliefs?

Prison actions or regulations that infringe upon an inmate's free exercise of his religious beliefs are valid if they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-52 (1987). Whether an action or regulation reasonably relates to legitimate penological interests depends upon four factors:

(1) whether the regulation has a logical connection to the legitimate government interests invoked to justify it; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right on which the regulation impinges remain open to prison inmates; (3) the impact that accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards, other inmates, and prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives that fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.

Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir.1989).

The prison official is entitled to qualified immunity unless her conduct "violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For a right to be clearly established, it must be "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violates that right ... in light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).