Is a convicted burglar's conduct after his prior convictions sufficiently serious to disqualify him from being able to testify with the aura of veracity of a witness?

All circumstances considered, the trial court reasonably concluded defendant's conduct after his prior convictions was sufficiently serious to disqualify him from being able to testify with the aura of veracity of one who has not sustained a prior felony conviction involving moral turpitude. "[A] felony conviction for burglary `demonstrates a "readiness to do evil" and hence necessarily involves moral turpitude.' [Citations.]" (People v. Castro (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1211, 1215.) Though defendant's burglary convictions occurred 21 and 19 years before the current offense, they were not isolated events but part of a long course of involvement with the criminal justice system. And though he was a young man at the time of the burglaries, his subsequent conduct offers little basis upon which to conclude his character has improved.

Nor was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit, nor ineffective assistance for counsel not to object to, reference to three prior convictions rather than just one. "A series of crimes relevant to character for truthfulness is more probative of credibility than a single lapse . . . ." (People v. Duran (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 485, 500.) Defendant's extensive record disqualifies him from testifying with even that remnant of an aura of veracity that might attend a lone felony conviction.

Accordingly, defendant's contention of error in allowing impeachment with his prior convictions must be rejected.