Can the United States assume civil jurisdiction over torture committed abroad?

I am therefore in agreement with Breyer J.’s concurring opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that assuming civil jurisdiction over torture committed abroad will not impair the objectives sought to be protected by comity: Today international law will sometimes similarly reflect not only substantive agreement as to certain universally condemned behavior but also procedural agreement that universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of that behavior. . . . That subset includes torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. . . . The fact that this procedural consensus exists suggests that recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect to a limited set of norms is consistent with principles of international comity. That is, allowing every nation’s courts to adjudicate foreign conduct involving foreign parties in such cases will not significantly threaten the practical harmony that comity principles seek to protect. That consensus concerns criminal jurisdiction, but consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction itself suggests that universal tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening. [Citations omitted; pp. 762-63.]