What is the difference between an explicit declaration of mind and statements that permit inference as to the declarant's state of mind?

In India v. Badesha, 2013 BCSC 1872, Fitch J. (as he then was), referred to the distinction between explicit declarations of state of mind and statements that permit an inference as to the declarant's state of mind:

Canada distinguishes explicit declarations of state of mind which fall under the traditional exception to the hearsay rule from statements that permit an inference as to the declarant's state of mind. Canada argues that statements permitting an inference as to the declarant's state of mind are not hearsay. Rather, such statements are original testimonial evidence that may be admitted as circumstantial evidence from which the existence of a state of mind can be inferred. In support of its submission on this point, Canada relies on the following observations of Doherty J. (as he then was) in P. (R.), at 341: Assuming relevance, evidence of utterances made by a deceased... which evidence her state of mind are admissible. If these statements are explicit statements of a state of mind, they are admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule. If those statements permit an inference as to the speaker's state of mind, they are regarded as original testimonial evidence and admitted as circumstantial evidence from which a state of mind can be inferred. The result is the same, whichever route is taken, although circumstantial evidence of a state of mind poses added problems [a]rising out of the inference drawing process...[citations omitted in India v. Badesha]