In what circumstances will the police be permitted to issue a Miranda warning to a suspect before and during questioning?

In People v. Nitschmann (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 677 we held: "A suspect may not 'out Mirandize' the police by reciting his Miranda rights and later claim the admonition was defective." (Id., at p. 683.) In Nitschmann the officers told defendant he had a right to consult an attorney but did not expressly say the attorney could be consulted before and during questioning. (Id., at pp. 682-683.) We concluded that defendant waived his rights and that Miranda did not operate in an overly technical way to exalt form over substance. (Ibid.) "Reviewing courts . . . need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonable 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.' [Citation.]" Duckworth v. Eagen (1989) 492 U.S. 195, 203 [106 L.Ed.2d 166, 177].)

Like Nitschmann, appellant acknowledged that he had the right to counsel and agreed to talk. (People v. Nitschmann, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 683.) Appellant had been advised of his Miranda rights "[p]lenty of times" and admitted, at the Miranda hearing, that he understood that he had the right to have an attorney present before and during questioning. "[T]hose who know the Miranda rules, including 'con-wise' arrestees such as appellant, are entitled to the admonition. But a rule excluding otherwise voluntary statements after the arrestee admonishes himself on the record would do violence to common sense. Here there was direct evidence that appellant was aware of his Miranda rights before talking to the police. This is the goal of Miranda. Where as here, the reason for the rule is satisfied, the rule should not operate in an overly technical way to exclude relevant evidence." (Id., at p. 683.)