In what circumstances will the Attorney General argue that asking someone to sit on the curb does not constitute a detention?

In that case, as in the present case, the Attorney General argued that asking, as opposed to directing, a person to sit on the curb does not constitute a detention. The Attorney General relied on People v. Cartwright (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1370, in which the court observed that "a mere request, as opposed to a command directing the person's movements, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment restraint." In rejecting this argument, the court in In re J.G. explained, "We accept that an officer's asking a person to sit on the curb, without more, does not generally constitute a detention. But Cartwright does not support the broad proposition that phrasing a statement as a request rather than a command necessarily prevents a detention from occurring. As Cartwright recognizes, if 'the content or form of the question impart[s] any compulsion to comply,' there may be a 'basis for finding [the suspect] was under the kind of restraint associated with a Fourth Amendment detention.' " (In re J.G., supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 412; see also People v. Linn (A145052) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 64, fn. 7 [Finding substantial evidence to support trial court's factual finding that the officer gave defendant a "command" but noting that

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