In what circumstances will the Attorney General argue that asking someone to sit on the curb does not constitute a detention?

In that case, as in the present case, the Attorney General argued that asking, as opposed to directing, a person to sit on the curb does not constitute a detention. The Attorney General relied on People v. Cartwright (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1370, in which the court observed that "a mere request, as opposed to a command directing the person's movements, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment restraint." In rejecting this argument, the court in In re J.G. explained, "We accept that an officer's asking a person to sit on the curb, without more, does not generally constitute a detention. But Cartwright does not support the broad proposition that phrasing a statement as a request rather than a command necessarily prevents a detention from occurring. As Cartwright recognizes, if 'the content or form of the question impart[s] any compulsion to comply,' there may be a 'basis for finding [the suspect] was under the kind of restraint associated with a Fourth Amendment detention.' " (In re J.G., supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 412; see also People v. Linn (A145052) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 64, fn. 7 [Finding substantial evidence to support trial court's factual finding that the officer gave defendant a "command" but noting that "[e]ven if the trial court had found that [the officer] merely 'asked' her to put out her cigarette and put down her soda can, it has been found under similar circumstances that an officer doing so does not negate the coercive nature of the request."].)