How have we interpreted the definition of "crime of violence" in the context of aggravated assault?

We construed 18 U.S.C. 16 in United States v. CeronSanchez, 223 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2000), where we held that an Arizona conviction for aggravated assault qualified as a "crime of violence." In so holding, we stressed that "the force necessary to constitute a crime of violence [ ] must actually be violent in nature." Id. at 1172. We rejected an argument by the appellant that since one could be convicted of aggravated assault in Arizona with a recklessness mens rea, the crime was not a "crime of violence," holding that reckless conduct satisfies the 16 definitions. Id. at 1173. The government urges us to extend this holding to cover negligent conduct as well. Because we believe that the definition of"crime of violence" found at 16 contains a volitional requirement absent from negligence, the government's argument must be rejected.

18 U.S.C. 16 defines "crime of violence " as: