How have the courts treated the testimony of a potential perjurious defense witness?

Trial counsel's actions were the result of an effort to reconcile his obligation as an officer of the court with his duty to vigorously represent his client. To discharge his ethical obligation to the court, defense counsel communicated, albeit in a cryptic manner, his concern about the witnesses' testimony and refrained from referring to the testimony in his closing argument. To discharge his duty to represent defendant, he called as witnesses the two men whose testimony defendant claimed would exonerate him. Through this procedure, the witnesses were able to present their versions of the events to the trier of fact. We believe that counsel's actions were a reasonable attempt to solve a dilemma to which there was no clear solution. Given that this procedure is permissible if the witness is the accused (People v. Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 941-946, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917 and authorities and cases cited therein), we find no error in applying it to the potentially perjurious defense witness in this situation. The procedure allows the accused to present what he believes is significant evidence of innocence; [19 Cal.App.4th 1713] defense counsel is protected from participating in the fraud; and the defendant is still assured of the aid of counsel in all other portions of the trial.