How have the courts treated the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in a pandering case?

Under the accusatory pleading test, counts 1 and 2 encompassed the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor as lesser included offenses. Because count 2 described L.D. as "a minor over age 16," the pandering offense charged in that count necessarily included contributing to the delinquency of a minor. (People v. Mathis (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1254-1255, 1257 (Mathis), capitalization omitted.) The same is true of count 1. The charging allegations under count 1 state that L.D. was less than 18 years of age when appellant violated section 236.1 by causing or inducing her to engage a commercial sex act, as defined in sections 266h, 266i, and 267. Subdivision (b)(2) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 provides that children are subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court when they are sexually trafficked, as described in section 236.1, and their parents have not protected them. Accordingly, under count 1, the misconduct alleged against appellant necessarily rendered L.D. subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. As respondent acknowledges, the charged offense thus included contributing to the delinquency of a minor as a lesser included offense.

Page 12

3. No Duty to Instruct

We turn to whether the trial court was obliged to instruct the jury regarding contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Generally, the court need not instruct on a lesser included offense when the defendant completely denies the charged offense, and no evidence reasonably supports the inference that the defendant committed only the lesser included offense. (People v. Sinclair (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1019-1020.) That is the case here. As explained below, the jury heard only two versions of appellant's relationship with L.D., neither of which supported an instruction regarding contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

The prosecution's account of appellant's relationship with L.D. relied primarily on L.D. herself, who testified that despite appellant's knowledge that she was 16 years old, he drove her to Los Angeles, where he put her to work as a prostitute, and used violence to regulate her conduct. The testimony, if credited by the jury, necessarily established the offenses charged in counts 1 and 2, each of which requires as an element a specific intent to induce someone to engage in illegal sex acts. (People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 980 [under section 266i, pandering is a specific intent crime]; Mathis, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 1256 [same]; see In re M.D. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 993, 1003 [under section 236.1, human trafficker must act "with the intent to effect or maintain a violation" of enumerated statutes specifying sex crimes].)