How have the courts treated evidence in this part of a criminal case where a witness gave evidence of the extent of a search of a property in which there were no residents?

All this was legitimate[106 N.Y. 526]evidence of facts from which, in connection with other evidence in the case, the jury were asked to infer the main fact that there were no such persons there resident. The evidence as to the assessment rolls did not call for the contents thereof, within the rule for proving the contents of written instruments, by producing them. It was evidence of the same kind already given, and was merely a description of what the witness did in making his search, and a statement of the result. It was an incidental and collateral fact. The whole evidence was given and received under the ruling of the court for the purpose of showing what the witness did himself, and not to prove the statements made by persons to whom the witness put his questions. In this respect the case differs from that, cited on the argument, of Wiggins v. People, 4 Hun, 540, where evidence of such answers was permitted, and the conviction may have been placed entirely upon it. The questions put to the witness here by the district attorney were only calculated to bring out a statement of the extent of the search made by him; and if, in answer thereto, one or two isolated remarks were made by the witness as to the response made to his inquiries, they were not asked for, were not responsive to the question, and were ruled distinctly and plainly by the trial judge to be improper. If the counsel for defendant desired to have them stricken from the record, he should have made his motion, and it would undoubtedly have been granted, in accordance with the rule already laid down, and acted upon by the judge. We do not see that any error in this part of the case was committed.