How have the courts interpreted the Chapman standard in determining whether facts relevant to a finding of materiality have been found?

5 The Kobrin court also noted that the trial court's rejection of proffered defense evidence tending to undermine a finding of materiality operated to compound the problem posed by "an inquiry already impermissibly speculative under this standard." (People v. Kobrin, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 430, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027.)

6 The Kobrin court's concluding statement that "[u]nder these circumstances, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the instruction had no effect on the jury's verdict ...." does not mean the court applied the Chapman standard. Read in the context of the entire opinion, the statement means that the court found the error reversible per se because it was not possible under the record to find it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court did not point out in its opinion any instructions given by the trial court which required the jury to consider facts relevant to materiality. (People v. Kobrin, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 430, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027.)