How have the courts interpreted jury instructions in a sexual assault case?

Defendant next argues that a series of standard jury instructionsCALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.10, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 2.90 and 8.20improperly described the process of assessing his guilt, diminished the prosecution's burden of proof, and placed a burden of proving innocence upon the defense. He also points to instances during voir dire when the trial court or the prosecutor used the word innocence to refer to what the jury would need to determine. This court has consistently rejected these and similar challenges, and we do so again here. ( People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 220221, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 125, 186 P.3d 496.) The court's instruction per CALJIC No. 2.90 at the conclusion of the guilt phase properly defined the prosecution's burden.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, on its own motion, that the jurors were required to agree unanimously on whether defendant committed premeditated murder or murder in the perpetration of rape and kidnapping. This court has repeatedly rejected this claim. Premeditated murder and felony murder are not distinct crimes; rather, they are alternative theories of liability, and jurors need not unanimously agree on a particular theory of liability in order to reach a unanimous verdict. ( People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 101, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099.)

Defendant asks us to reconsider our long-standing rejection of challenges to the

[328 P.3d 28]