How have courts interpreted the word "knowing" in criminal legislation?

"'The word "knowing" as used in a criminal statute imports only an awareness of the facts which bring the proscribed act within the terms of the statute. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 598.) '"Reliance on circumstantial evidence is often inevitable when, as here, the issue is a state of mind such as knowledge.' [Citation.]" (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 379.)

In interpreting the statutory requirement of knowledge, "we strive to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent." (People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 8.) "Because statutory language 'generally provide[s] the most reliable indicator' of that intent [citations], we turn to the words themselves, giving them their 'usual and ordinary meanings' and construing them in context [citation]." (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 747.) The statute punishes one who "actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang...." ( 186.22, subd. (a).)

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