How have courts interpreted section 667.6 of the California Sex Offences Act when a defendant is convicted of a series of sex crimes committed within minutes of each other?

Several cases are instructive, but not dispositive. In People v. Fleming (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 540, 189 Cal.Rptr. 619, the defendant was convicted of 11 offenses including seven sex crimes. The court held both subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 667.6 applied. In determining when subdivision (d) applied, the court said: "We can discern at most three 'separate occasions' on which offenses were committed--two oral copulations in concert and one forcible rape at the house, two oral copulations in concert in the motel early in the evening, and one forcible oral copulation and one forcible rape in the motel several hours later. To characterize sexual acts occurring within a few moments or even a few seconds of each other, such as those at the house, as offenses committed on 'separate occasions,' is to rob that term of any meaning. A basic rule of statutory interpretation is that courts should avoid a construction which renders a part of a statute 'surplusage.' [Citation.] Applying subdivision (d) to acts committed within minutes of each other leaves no room for permissive imposition of consecutive sentences under subdivision (c). Consequently, we conclude that some intervening events or passage of time must occur between sexual offenses before subdivision (d) is applicable." (Id., at p. 545, 189 Cal.Rptr. 619; see also People v. Sutton (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 438, 209 Cal.Rptr. 536.)