How has the court treated evidence in the case of the possession of a prison-made knife in a surprise attack?

(People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) The first three counts involved conduct to lull another inmate into a false sense of security followed by a surprise attack with a prison-made weapon. The fact that the attack on Addis occurred in the exercise yard in front of numerous witnesses and seemed to involve Green in the plan, whereas the attack on Matthews occurred while defendant was alone in his cell and with no participation by any other inmate, does not negate the significant similarities. (See Alcala v. Superior Court, supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 1225, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 185 P.3d 708 [the similarity required to admit evidence to prove a common plan "can be met despite the existence of some factual differences between or among the charged offenses"].) Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly finding the evidence in these three counts to be cross-admissible. Like the other three counts, count four involved the possession of a prison-made stabbing weapon. Therefore, the other counts were admissible to establish a common plan to possess a prison-made weapon such as the sharpened metal object that fell to the floor when the gate to defendant's cell was opened.

In addition, as defendant concedes, "even the complete absence of cross-admissibility does not, by itself, demonstrate prejudice from a failure to order a requested severance." (Alcala v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1221, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 185 P.3d 708.) Rather, we look to the remaining three factors. (Ibid. ) An examination of those factors does not reveal an abuse of discretion.

First, none of the joined charges was unusually likely to inflame the jury against

[385 P.3d 351]