How has the Attorney General argued that the use of the word "slight" in CALCRIM No. 359 reduced the prosecutor's burden of proof?

Defendant argues that the use of the word "slight" in CALCRIM No. 359 impermissibly lessened the prosecutor's burden of proof. He relies on federal cases holding that it is error to tell a jury that a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy when there is only "slight evidence" of his or her participation. (See United States v. Gray (5th Cir. 1980) 626 F.2d 494, 500.)

The Attorney General contends that defendant forfeited this claim because he did not object below. The Attorney General also argues that CALCRIM No. 359 provides a correct statement of the law (see People v. Reyes (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1498), and that when the instructions are considered as a whole, the jury was clearly informed it could only convict defendant if it found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.