Notwithstanding the good sense of the Haultain judgment in Wylie v. Patton, supra, the facts of the instant case and, mostly important, the provisions of the Act under consideration, indicate that the reasoning of Gilham v. Steele, supra, is applicable and should be followed. That is to say, I adopt the view that the clear necessary intendment indicates the conclusion or result arrived at in Gilham v. Steele, namely, the purported marriage to be void ab initio and accordingly a nullity. A very narrow point causes me slight hesitancy. It is the reference in s. 50 (now s. 46) to the non-registration of a marriage "by the officiating clergyman or other person". The "other person" is one authorized by the Act to solemnize marriage. Under s. 44 of the Act (now s. 41), supra, the responsibility to register a marriage conducted in accordance with the rights and ceremonies of the Doukhobortsi, rests with one or both of the parties thereto. Was it then open to either or both of the parties to this marriage to make application for a declaration of validity under s. 50 (now s. 46)? A liberal and broad interpretation of the statute as a whole and s. 50 (now s. 46) in particular favours an affirmative answer to that question. I am sure that I would give such an answer if I were required to do so but what I am about to say, being conclusive of the matter on another, although somewhat related point and leading to the same result makes it unnecessary to dwell further on that question at this time.
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