Is a claim founded in equity?

However, so long as the plaintiffs can fit themselves within the strictures of a claim founded in equity, they are at liberty to do so even though they might not have a claim at law. In my respectful opinion, that is what is intended by the comments of McLachlin J., as she then was, in Peter v. Beblow (1993), 1993 CanLII 126 (SCC), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (S.C.C.) ("Peter") at 648: It is precisely where an injustice arises without a legal remedy that equity finds a role.

Furthermore, the mere fact that the matter pleaded is novel or unusual does not militate against its use, at least at this stage of the proceedings. In that respect, the comments of Dickson J. in Pettkus v. Becker (1980), 1980 CanLII 22 (SCC), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (S.C.C) ("Pettkus") at 273 are most instructive: It would be undesirable and indeed impossible to attempt to define all the circumstances in which an unjust enrichment might arise. The great advantage of the ancient principles of equity is their flexibility: the judiciary is thus able to shape these malleable principles so as to accommodate the changing needs and mores of society, in order to achieve justice.