Does unconsciousness resulting from voluntary intoxication reduce murder to involuntary manslaughter?

Citing earlier case law allowing unconsciousness resulting from voluntary intoxication to reduce murder to involuntary manslaughter, which defined necessary mental state as "'criminal negligence'" (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 423), defendant claims "she should be able to defend" against the gross vehicular manslaughter charge because "her mental state of unconsciousness cannot rise to the level of gross negligence" required for a conviction on that offense. (CALCRIM No. 590.) Consequently, defendant again asserts the court's "failure to instruct the jury to consider whether or not [she] was unconscious at the time of driving deprived [her]" of the rights to due process, equal protection, and the "right to have the jury determine every material issue of fact" relating to count 2.