Does the trial court abuse its discretion to exclude evidence that supports a plaintiff's claim of failure to give informed consent?

Having concluded the evidence was relevant to plaintiff's claim of failure to give informed consent, the question remains whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to exclude the evidence as unduly prejudicial under section 352. Appellant argues the evidence was prejudicial because it suggested that plaintiff "was a bad person for failing to seek medical care earlier for his latent tuberculosis" and for potentially becoming "a danger to his pediatric patients." He relies on the following passage found in People v. Escudero (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 302, 310: " '[E]vidence should be excluded . . . as unduly prejudicial when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating [them] to use the information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors' emotional reaction. In such a circumstance, the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the substantial likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate purpose.' [Citation.]"

" 'Prejudicial]' in [section 352] does not mean 'damaging' to a party's case, it means evoking an emotional response that has very little to do with the issue on which the evidence is offered. [Citation.] Evidence which has probative value must be excluded under section 352 only if it is 'undu[ly]' prejudicial despite its legitimate probative value. [Citation.]" (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 597.) As one appellate court has explained: "[T]he idea that evidence should be excluded because it is 'highly prejudicial' to a litigant's case is a classic error. Often the most highly probative evidence is also highly damning, and therefore 'prejudicial' in a superficial sense of the word. [Section 352] does not, however, allow for the exclusion of evidence merely

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because it is 'prejudicial' in the sense of damaging to a litigant's position. The relevant phrase from the statute is 'substantial danger of undue prejudice.' . . . Undue prejudice springs from evidence which has ' " 'very little effect on the issues.' " ' [Citations.]" (O'Mary v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 563, 575.)