Does the term "injured person" under section 3333.4 of the California Highway Code apply to plaintiffs who have not been injured by the accident?

I do not suggest that plaintiffs have not been "injured" by their daughter's death. (See Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, 68, 137 Cal.Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022.) However, the majority has not presented any compelling argument that the term "injured person" under the section should be defined generally as any plaintiff seeking recovery (which definition would render the term "injured" surplusage), when the statutory language itself supports a narrower definition.

Section 3333.3, which also was enacted as part of Proposition 213, also supports my interpretation. The majority asserts that section 3333.3's language is "[p]arallel" to that of section 3333.4. (Maj. opn., ante, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 227, 980 P.2d at p. 932.) The language is hardly parallel; rather, it is quite different. Section 3333.4 precludes nonpecuniary damages when the "injured person" is an uninsured motorist. By contrast, section 3333.3 prohibits any damages in a negligence action if the "plaintiff's injuries" were caused by the "plaintiff's" commission of a felony. We may reasonably conclude that if the electorate intended "injured person" to mean "plaintiff" in section 3333.4, it would have stated so specifically, as it did in section 3333.3. "[W]hen the drafters of a statute have employed a term in one place and omitted it in another, it should not be inferred where it has been excluded." (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1010, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.) The electorate's use of the term "injured person" in section 3333.4 rather than section 3333.3's broader reference to "plaintiff" shows clearly that the electorate intended a different meaning.