Does the rule of automatic reversal apply to denial of counsel in a capital case?

Thus, "[i]n limited situations . . . , where the denial of counsel was for a discrete time or hearing only, the high court has recognized that the rule of automatic reversal is inappropriate. In such circumstances, the denial of the right to counsel, even during a critical stage in a capital case, does not require automatic reversal but is instead subject to harmless error review." (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 700; Chapman v. State of California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 20-21 (Chapman).)

Here, the trial court acknowledged that its ex parte communication with the district attorney should not have occurred outside of defendant's presence. However, this improper communication did not amount to a " ' "defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceed[ed]." ' " (People v. Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 410.) It was not a

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