Does the plain error standard of review apply here?

^[1] Saglimbeni does not dispute that she failed to raise her procedural objections at sentencing, and thus, does not dispute that the plain error standard applies here. Instead, she submits that this standard is "typically relaxed in the sentencing context, especially where, as here, 'the defendant does not receive prior notice of the [supervised release] condition.'" Appellant's Br. at 11 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2010)). As an initial matter, Saglimbeni does not challenge the conditions of her supervised release, nor can she, as the district court did not impose any such conditions in relation to her challenged sentence. Further, Saglimbeni otherwise fails to articulate the "circumstances that [would] permit us to relax the . . . rigorous standards of plain error review to correct sentencing errors," and thus it is entirely unclear why a relaxed plain error standard of review would apply here. United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002). In any event, even if we were to apply the plain error standard "without insisting on strict compliance with the rigorous standards of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 52(b)," Green, 618 F.3d at 122, our decision to affirm the district court's judgment would remain unchanged.