Does the fact that section 496 and 496d both criminalize receipt of stolen property constitute an equal protection violation?

Defendant fares no better with respect to receiving a stolen vehicle under section 496d. The fact that section 496 and section 496d both criminalize receipt of stolen property is, in and of itself, insufficient to establish an equal protection violation. As previously stated, "neither the existence of two identical criminal statutes prescribing different levels of punishments, nor the exercise of a prosecutor's discretion in charging under one such statute and not the other, violates equal protection principles." (People v. Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 838.) "[N]umerous factors properly may enter into a prosecutor's decision to charge under one statute and not another, such as a defendant's background and the severity of the crime, and so long as there is no showing that a

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defendant 'has been singled out deliberately for prosecution on the basis of some invidious criterion,' that is, "'one that is arbitrary and thus unjustified because it bears no rational relationship to legitimate law enforcement interests[,]"' the defendant cannot make out an equal protection violation." (Id. at pp. 838-839, quoting Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568-569.)⁷