Does the District Court err in denying a motion to dismiss the indictment for alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act?

1. The district court did not err in denying Samuel's motion to dismiss the indictment for alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161 et. seq. Samuel argues that the district court violated the Speedy Trial Act by failing to make factual findings supporting the exclusions of time it ordered and to weigh the "ends of justice" exceptions against the public's and her interests in a speedy trial. We review the district court's decision for "clear error as to factual findings and de

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novo as to application of legal standards." United States v. Alvarez-Perez, 629 F.3d 1053, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2010).

Samuel's motion to dismiss the indictment for violations of the Speedy Trial Act was based on five separate district court orders excluding time. The district court made specific factual findings supporting the "ends of justice" reasons it cited on each of the occasions it ordered an exclusion of time and therefore did not err in denying Samuel's motion.¹ Samuel's argument that the district court failed to conduct an explicit balancing test explaining why the "ends of justice" reasons it cited for granting the continuances outweighed the public's and her interests in a speedy trial is unavailing because this court does not require such explicit balancing. See, e.g., United States v. Shetty, 130 F.3d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the district court satisfied the Speedy Trial Act by citing "undisputed facts to support each continuance at issue").