Does the Attorney General have any grounds to argue that the jury was confused by the fact that rape felony murder requires a specific intent to rape?

Defendant contends that the jury was likely confused by having been instructed that while rape is a general intent offense, rape felony murder requires a specific intent to rape. We rejected much the same contention in People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965. "In accord with the general CALJIC instructions, the trial court instructed the jury that rape and sodomy are general intent crimes, but that rape-felony-murder requires a finding that defendant had the specific intent to commit rape. Although defendant does not contend that the instructions erroneously stated the applicable legal principles, he maintains that the

[131 Cal.Rptr.2d 490]

combination of general and specific intent elements could only have been confusing to the jury, requiring `proof of contradictory mental states.' The Attorney General responds that the instructions were not misleading and did not require proof of contradictory mental states, but rather accurately set forth the different elements of the separate crimes with which defendant was charged. [] The Attorney General's position is well taken. The instructions did not require proof of contradictory mental states. Under the instructions, if the jury found that defendant did not act with the specific intent to rape, it could have found him guilty of rape but not of rape-felony-murder. If the jury found that defendant did act with the specific intent to rape, it could have found him guilty of both rape and rape-felony-murder. There was no inconsistency in the instructions." (Id. at pp. 1177-1178, 270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965, fn. omitted.)

[131 Cal.Rptr.2d 490]