Does the Attorney General have to issue a reversal of a finding of intent under section 11379 of the California Highway Traffic Code where he omitted the specific intent to sell methamphetamine from the relevant inquiry?

necessarily prejudicial error.' " (People v. Joiner (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 221, 224.) And the Attorney General also acknowledges that the new element, specific intent, is now required to sustain a conviction for transportation of methamphetamine under section 11379. Nevertheless, in this case the Attorney General insists the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury actually found the requisite special intent, albeit in the context of possession of the methamphetamine for sale. Based solely on the unique facts of this case, we must agree.

An automatic reversal is not required where, as here, the relevant inquiry posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 676.) The relevant inquiry is whether defendant entertained the specific intent to sell methamphetamine. The jury expressly found, based on properly given instructions on the specific intent to sell methamphetamine while possessing it, that defendant did indeed have the specific intent to sell. Based on the evidence presented to the jury, a finding that he intended to sell while possessing the methamphetamine was tantamount to a finding he possessed it while transporting because the time frame in which defendant possessed it was the same time frame in which he was transporting it.