Does the Attorney General have any authority to strike a strike?

As the Attorney General points out, citing People v. Rodriguez (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1262-1263, the court has discretion to order consecutive sentences when the crimes involve separate crimes or separate victims. And, at sentencing, the court stated "the acts of which [defendant] was convicted in this case were separate acts. There were three separate victims, multiple acts with respect to each victim. Each charge of which he stands convicted was a separate crime. And, consequently, the court will be imposing consecutive sentences."

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4. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike defendant's prior conviction.

In explaining her refusal to strike the prior conviction, the court stated, "I considered the Romero [People v. Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497] circumstances and whether or not it would be appropriate to strike the strike. Because the strike is identical to the classification of crime that was committed in the case on which the defendant was sentenced last week, I referred to the factors under Romero . . . and came to the conclusion that the strike should not be stricken. The defendant's background and character and the information contained in both probation reports from both cases suggest that he is a known sexual predator in the community. The conviction in the earlier case was sometime in 2003, I believe. And the charges that we addressed in this case arose in between which is not a significant period of time. It does not appear that the defendant has prospects for a crime-free life." Defendant focuses on the court's statement "the charges that we addressed in this case arose in between" and concludes not only that the court was mistaken in thinking the earlier conviction preceded all of the charges involved in the present case, but also that this must be why the court refused to exercise its discretion in striking the prior conviction. We believe defendant reads too much into this phrase.