California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from In re JW, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 897, 29 Cal.4th 200, 57 P.3d 363 (Cal. 2002):
Family Code section 7895 states that an appellate court must appoint counsel for a parent unable to afford counsel "[u]pon appeal from a judgment freeing a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court from parental custody and control ...." (Italics added.) As we recognized in Bryce C, supra, 12 Cal.4th at page 230, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275, the italicized language on its face appears to restrict the right to appellate counsel to actions in which the child is a juvenile court dependent. This follows from two principles of statutory construction. One principle assumes that every part of a statute serves a purpose and that nothing is superfluous. The other principle, commonly known under the Latin name of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is that the expression of one thing in a statute ordinarily implies the exclusion of other things. (Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 852, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500, 863 P.2d 745.) Thus, if we were to consider only the bare words of the statute, without regard to its legislative history or other evidence of legislative intent, we might be inclined to assume that Family Code section 7895's express statement that the right to appellate counsel exists when the child is a juvenile court dependent implies that the right does not exist when the child is not a juvenile court dependent.
The above passage should not be considered legal advice. Reliable answers to complex legal questions require comprehensive research memos. To learn more visit www.alexi.com.