Does section 667, subdivision (e.2)(2)(C)(iii) of the Criminal Code exclude a convicted felon in possession of a firearm from resentencing?

Finally, Bloodsaw contends construing section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii)'s arming exclusion as he suggests comports with the electorate's intent to shorten sentences for less dangerous felons while ensuring the "truly dangerous felons [are] kept behind bars." (See People v. Brimmer, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 793 [discussion of electorate's intent].) He urges that the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm is not categorized as a serious or violent offense; possession of a weapon is, by itself, lawful and does not present a public danger; section 1170.126, subdivision (f) suffices to protect public safety, in that it allows a trial court to deny resentencing to an eligible inmate if resentencing poses an unreasonable risk of danger; and an interpretation of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iii) that excludes fewer inmates would further the electorate's goal of saving incarceration costs.

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Again, we disagree. The electorate was told in the relevant ballot materials that if the offender had committed gun-related felonies, or his or her current offense involved firearm possession, he or she would still be subject to a life sentence under the Three Strikes law. (See People v. Blakely, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1055 [discussing Proposition 36 ballot materials].) Given these representations in the ballot materials, we think voters would be surprised to learn that the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm could never exclude an inmate from eligibility.