California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Arteaga, F066140 (Cal. App. 2014):
The terms "specific intent" and "general intent" differ in that, "'"When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is [general intent]. When the definition refers to a defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent."' [Citation.]" (People v. Ford (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 985, 989.)
We agree with defendant's assertion that section 288.7, subdivision (b), when violated by an act of sexual penetration, is a specific intent crime. Sexual penetration requires that defendant committed the act of penetration of the victim's "genital or anal opening for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or by any unknown object." ( 289, subd. (k)(1), italics added; accord People v. Ngo (2014)
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